

A Fast and Compact RISC-V Accelerator for Ascon and Friends

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- Versatile building block *ASCON-p*
 - Used by *ASCON* and *ISAP*
- Accelerator with *ISAP* mode
 - AEAD with hardening against implementation attacks
 - Desired feature in NIST LWC competition
 - Covers both power analysis and fault attacks
 - No need for protected hardware building blocks

Background

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
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- Permutation function *ASCON-p*
- Authenticated encryption, hashing, PRNG

- ASCON- p is called in $p^a = 12$ and $p^b = 6$ or 8 times
- Hashing works in a similar manner



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- Versatile and flexible:
 - ISAP-A-128A, ISAP-A-128
 - ASCON, ASCON-HASH, ASCON-XOF

Building an Accelerator

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
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 - Integrate tightly as new custom instruction
 - Mode remains entirely in software
 - Basic building block for *ASCON* and *ISAP*

- Add *ASCON-p* on RI5CY/CV32E40P core
- 32-bit RISC-V CPU implementing RV32IM[F]C ISA
 - 32 general purpose registers
 - Additional instructions for DSP
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- Necessary changes:
 - Instruction encoding
 - Register file adaptations
 - Decode stage adaptations

- I-type instruction


- I-type instruction
- 12-bit Immediate encodes
 - Round Constant (8 bit)
 - Number of rounds (3 bit)
 - Endianness (1 bit)



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- Each *ASCON-p* 64-bit lanes split to two registers




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- *ASCON-p* instruction:
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- Limitations:
 - ALU and load-store unit forward results to next instruction
 - → *ASCON-p* registers must not be altered the cycle before
 - → *ASCON-p* registers must not be loaded to two cycles before




- Main data processing loop

Code 1 Encrypt Block Loop

```

1: <encrypt_block_start>:
2: lw t1,0(t0)
3: lw s1,4(t0)
4: xor a2,a2,t1
5: xor a3,a3,s1
6: sw a2,0(s8)
7: sw a3,4(s8)
8: ASCON-P(ROUND_CONSTANT)
   :
   : 6-times
14: addi t0,t0,8
15: addi s8,s8,8
16: bgeu t2,t0, <encrypt_block_start>

```



Plaintext

Performance

Table 1: RISC-V RI5CY: Runtime and code size comparison of ASCON and ISAP, with/without 1-round ASCON- p hardware acceleration (HW-A)

Implementations	Cycles/Byte			Binary Size (B)
	64 B	1536 B	long	
Ascon-C (-03)	164.3	110.6	108.3	11 716
Ascon-C (-0s)	269.7	187.1	183.5	2 104
Ascon-ASM + HW-A	4.2	2.2	2.1	888
AsconHash-ASM + HW-A	4.6	2.6	2.5	484
ISAP-A-128a-C (-03)	1 184.3	386.9	352.3	11 052
ISAP-A-128a-ASM + HW-A	29.1	5.2	4.2	1 844

Table 2: Area comparison of the RISC-V RI5CY core and various co-processor designs

Design	kGE	
	Standalone	Integration
RI5CY base design	45.6	-
This work	4.2	0.5
ASCON co-processor [Gro+15]	7.1	?
ASCON co-processor [Gro]	9.4	?
ISAP co-processor (estimated) [Dob+19]	≤ 12.8	?

Implementation Security of ISAP

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- Analyzed in detail in the paper

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- Acceleration of one block can be used for a broad range of cryptographic primitives
 - With and without implementation security
- One can get more performance **AND** better protection from implementation attacks.

Thank you!

- [Dob+19] C. Dobraunig, M. Eichlseder, S. Mangard, F. Mendel, B. Mennink, R. Primas, and T. Unterluggauer. ISAP v2.0. Submission to the NIST Lightweight Crypto Competition. <https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Projects/lightweight-cryptography/documents/round-2/spec-doc-rnd2/isap-spec-round2.pdf>. 2019.
- [Gro] H. Groß. CAESAR Hardware API reference implementation. https://github.com/IAIK/ascon_hardware/tree/master/caesar_hardware_api_v1_0_3/ASCON_ASCON (accessed 12/2019). (Visited on 12/2019).
- [Gro+15] H. Groß, E. Wenger, C. Dobraunig, and C. Ehrenhöfer. Suit up! - Made-to-Measure Hardware Implementations of ASCON. In: DSD. IEEE Computer Society, 2015, pp. 645–652.